DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. ltr, 2/22/85
D.o.D letter 6/7/85 AW

~~TOP SECRET~~

B-12789/1

HEADQUARTERS
FEAF BOMBER COMMAND PROVISIONAL
APO 328

16 August 1951

Major General Thomas S. Power
Deputy Commander
Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

Dear General Power,

Thank you very much for your letter of 3 August with the evaluation system for reconnaissance units attached. I am not in any way satisfied with the results being obtained by the 91st Squadron. I don't believe that discredit attaches to any person in the 91st and feel that this information you have given me will help us to sharpen up our reconnaissance program all the way around.

With my letter of 8 August to General LeMay I attached a copy of the letter asking for spot promotion authority for lead crews and a copy of the indorsement which was forwarded by General Weyland to Headquarters USAF on 26 July. I hope to get some indication of USAF action in the near future, and if approved, feel that it will make my lead crew program healthy and effective.

By now you should have all the scope photography on the three RB-45 missions which have been run for Strategic Air Command so far. It has been most difficult worming this photography out of FEAF. My difficulty seems to have been that although I initiate the mission as SAC XRAY and execute the mission as Bomber Command, I have no control over the film after it leaves the airplane and goes to the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. As a result, FEAF in the person of its Director of Reconnaissance has considerably delayed the much-needed photography, and in one case furnished two photographs within the twenty-mile radius, only one of which was valuable for target prediction. I had a showdown a few days ago with Charlie Banfill and believe that arrangements made will allow us to complete the remaining photography and obtain the results in the shortest possible time. As you probably also know, I am restricted on future missions to those targets which lie south of 32 degrees north latitude in the coastal areas. I could have accomplished these remaining flights by the present date had not FEAF placed an added visual photographic requirement on me for the flights. My problem now is to await adequate weather for visual

SACNY-46

DECLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 sheets
Copy No 1 of 3 copies

DECLASSIFIED

photography. I feel rather badly that we are restricted on this important scope photography during the Armistice negotiations but presume that there are good reasons for it. If it ever does open up again, the plans are all laid to complete photography on remaining SAC targets in a minimum of time and with minimum risk to the aircraft and crews participating. The two B-45 crews who got all of the previous scope photography have now been rotated to the Z.I. and two new crews are in place ready to go. Their qualifications are equally as good as the old crews in my opinion.

I have done everything I can to keep from stepping on anyone's toes in my second responsibility as Deputy Commanding General, SAC XRAY; however, I managed to get myself in a kettle of hot water with General Weyland as a result of my recommendation to you to not consider the diversionary crews as a part of the FEAF strike force. In view of the fact that I informed his Deputy for Operations by memorandum prior to making the recommendation to you, I felt that I was fully within my rights as SAC XRAY Deputy Commander. As you know, FEAF feels extremely strongly about its D-Day medium bomber bombing force. Not all of the bitterness which was apparent when you were here has gone as yet.

On the 14th of August we ran a full scale effort on Pyongyang. We ran into the same visual bombing difficulties we contended with in World War II. Our target attack time was 1200, could not be made earlier because the fighters were unable to get off. Since they were a major part of the participating force, FEAF would not allow us to hit the target a necessary one hour earlier. At 1100, which was the departure time from the assembly areas, the weather scouting force reported only scattered low clouds in the target area with an upper deck beginning at 21,000. We had two plans - one for visual and one for Shoran - and the leader rightfully called for visual based on this weather report. Within the next hour's period during the progress from assembly area through control point, fighter rendezvous, initial point into target, the low clouds thickened up to 8/10th's coverage. The first Wing which was John Reynolds' Wing elected to hold their bombs and come back and bomb Shoran on the second run. They did a beautiful job on the second run, covering about 65 percent of their assigned target area. While they did a fine job they took quite a lot of battle damage in the air on their two passes over the many heavy guns which are radar controlled in Pyongyang. The second Group in - the 19th - elected to bomb visual on the first pass and threw all their bombs away. The third Wing - the 98th - was far enough behind to switch over and bomb Shoran on the first run and did an excellent job with good coverage of its assigned target areas. As you can see from this, the mission was a success because of Shoran bombing in spite of the weather.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

B-12789

John Henry and his Intelligence man McCracken are doing a fine job of maintaining cordial relations with the GHQ people and FEAF, and are continuing to keep the position of SAC XRAY in the proper perspective for those concerned. Thanks again for sending the reconnaissance information and best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Bob

ROBERT H. TERRILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET